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REFORM OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE-
POSSIBILITIES SUGGESTED BY HONEYMAN v.
JACOBS
HAROLD C. VAUGHAN t
With increasing frequency in recent months, leading New York
newspapers have complained of the excessive costs of foreclosure of
mortgages in this State. While the writers of those articles were pri-
marily concerned with the evils of this situation as they affect the local
real estate market, the fault is by no means confined to New York;
the problem is rather one of nationwide concern. This matter attracts
particular attention at this time because of the greater difficulties
encountered by the Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal
Housing Administration, in their efforts to assist small home owners,
in states where costs of foreclosures are high and the procedure cum-
bersome, as compared with those where a simple procedure and low
costs prevail.
It is obvious that the attractiveness of a secured loan as an in-
vestment is vitally affected by the cost and facility of enforcing the
security. Naturally, the smaller the sum involved and the smaller the
value of the security, the greater is the part played by this consider-
ation in the mind of the potential investor. Consequently, while
the cumbersome procedure and excessive costs of foreclosure in New
York and certain other states do not deter the flotation of large cor-
porate bond issues, they are a very serious deterrent to the making of
small mortgages, thereby causing hardship to potential small home
owners.
For example, a resident of New York who wishes to own his own
home but needs a loan of two or three thousand dollars for the pur-
pose, will find it much more difficult to obtain it than a resident of
Massachusetts or Connecticut would under similar circumstances. The
reason for this is that the New York mortgagee knows that, in the
event of default, it will cost him approximately five hundred dollars
to enforce his security, whereas the Massachusetts or Connecticut
mortgagee can do so for less than one hundred dollars. This inability
of the potential small home owner to obtain the loan he needs in turn
affects adversely both the local real estate market and the local build-
ing industry..
t A.B., 1930, Princeton University; LL. B., 1933, Columbia University; Member
of the New York Bar; author of The Salvage of Mortgages by Trustees (1937) 37
COL. L. REv. 61; and of other articles in legal periodicals.
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I. TiE PROBLEM
Fundamentally, the test of any system of procedure on foreclosure
is the extent to which it secures an equitable balance between the con-
flicting interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee. It must be borne
in mind that a mortgage in essence is a transaction by which one party,
the mortgagee, makes a loan to the other party, the mortgagor, who
as security for his debt confers on the lender the right to obtain pay-
ment of his loan out of certain real property owned by the borrower,
in the event that the debt is not repaid when due.' In giving each
party his rightful claim, the law has endeavored to balance their com-
peting interests, affording as many benefits and imposing as few
hardships as possible. Whereas economic conditions and the concomi-
tant policy considerations may at one time require that the interests
of one party be advanced, and this necessarily to the detriment of the
other, similar dictates at another period prompt the court to swing
the balance in the opposite direction. Thus it is that the Anglo-Amer-
ican jurisdictions, all cognizant of the true relationship between the
parties, are ever seeking, by their varying forms of procedure, to
effect such reforms as are likely to attain what might be called an
ideal equilibrium between the various competing interests involved.
At any rate, the fact of this continuing struggle between the creditor
and debtor is a primary consideration well to bear in mind. Any
analysis of the relationship between them as crystallized in a mortgage
must necessarily and inherently embody a realization of that struggle.
In seeking to devise a system of foreclosure which will be both ex-
peditious and cheap and which will at the same time render substantial
equity, it becomes apparent that the greatest obstacle to simplification
is the problem of the deficiency judgment. This problem, unknown to
the early law of mortgages, is now more beset with complications than
any other phase of the subject matter. They arise largely out of mis-
conceptions of the nature of deficiency judgments and a tendency to
exalt long continued use of a mere procedural device to the status of
a substantive, vested right. The Supreme Court of the United States,
2
i. The mortgage was first known to the early English common law as the "mor-
tuum vadium", or "dead pledge", because until redeemed the property was dead to the
pledgor. Blackstone defined a "fee in mortgage" as an "estate upon condition". 2 BL.
COMM. *157-159. The title to the fee was in the mortgagee, subject to defeasance if the
mortgagor paid his debt on the due date. The mortgagee was entitled to occupy the
land and enjoy the rents and profits immediately upon execution of the mortgage. 2
KENT CO 1a. I8 et seq. But this right to immediate use of the land never existed in
New York. Jackson v. Willard, 4 Johns. 41 (N. Y. I8O9). However, the more cus-
tomary course was for the mortgagee to wait until default to enter, as otherwise he
would be accountable to the mortgagor for the rents and profits. Newall v. Wright,
3 Mass. 138 (1807); Erskine v. Townsend, _ Mass. 493 (1807); Anonymous, i Vern.
45, 23 Eng. Rep. R. 298 (1682) ; 2 BL. COMM. *157 et seq.; 6 KENT COMM. 181 et seq.
2. Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 539 (1938).
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in a decision whose importance can hardly be exaggerated, has done
much to dispel these misconceptions, thereby facilitating the removal
of this obstacle to the adoption of a simplified form of foreclosure,
which would at the same time render a more desirable result with
equal efficacy. This decision also points the way to a re-examination
of the problem in the light of its history.
II. FORECLOSURE
Under the early law, when the mortgagor failed to pay his debt
on the due date, the mortgagee's title, theretofore subject to defeas-
ance, became absolute, and he was entitled to immediate entry and pos-
session, without the necessity of further legal action.3  He could dis-
train for rent against a tenant even though the latter had not attorned,
4
and he could maintain an action of trespass or ejectment against the
mortgagor for possession.5 On the other hand, if the mortgagor paid
his debt on the due date, title reverted to him and he could oust the
mortgagee through an action of ejectment." This was the sole rem-
edy afforded the mortgagor by the common law. Eventually, how-
ever, as realization grew that frequently the mortgagee obtained an
unconscionable advantage over the mortgagor through the forfeiture
of estates worth considerably more than the amount of the debt,
equity came to the relief of the mortgagor. In order to withhold from
the creditor the pound of flesh he was claiming, the chancellors evolved
the theory known as the "equity of redemption", 7 whereby, even after
default, the mortgagor could "redeem" the property by payment of
the debt with interest to the date of payment and any expenses which
the mortgagee might legitimately have incurred by reason of the
default. The next step, necessitated by the fact that the mortgagor's
bill to redeem was a continuing threat to the security of titles to land,
3. Newall v. Wright, 3 Mass. 138 (1807); Erskine v. Townsend, 2 Mass. 493
(1807) ; Moss v. Gallimore, i Doug. 279, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 182 (1779) ; 2 BL. COMM.
*x57-1 59; 6 KENT COMM. ISI et seq.; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) § 650.
In New York, the right to take possession after default without foreclosure was elim-
inated by statute in I83 O. 2 N. Y. RFV. STAT. 312, § 57; Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y.
306, 84 N. E. 75 (19o8) ; Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599 (1874).
4. Moss v. Gallimore, I Doug. 279, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 182 (1779). See also Note
(1931) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 269.
5. Newall v. Wright, 3 Mass. 138 (18o7); Erskine v. Townsend, 2 Mass. 493
(1807).
6. 2 BL. COMM. *157 et seq. For a modern analysis of this device, see Note (1939)
25 VA. L. REv. 947.
7. 2 BL. COMM. *157 et seq.; 6 KENT COMM. 181 et seq. For an excellent his-
torical discussion, see Clark v. Rayburn, 8 Wall. 318 (U. S. 1868) and Goodenow v.
Ewer, 16 Cal. 461 (i86o). This early "equity of redemption" must be distinguished
from the present use of the word to connote the interest in the property which remains
in the mortgagor during the existence of the mortgage, i. e., prior to satisfaction or
foreclosure. It is interesting to note that in New York it was held that the equity of
redemption could not be waived. Hughes v. Harlam, 166 N. Y.427, 6o N.E. 22 (1901).
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involved the old proceeding known as "strict foreclosure". 8  This
enabled the mortgagee, at any time after default, to file a bill in chan-
cery requiring the mortgagor to pay the entire debt with interest and
costs within a fixed period of time; failure to make such payment
rendered the mortgagee's title to the land absolute.9
While the practice of strict foreclosure secured to the mortgagee
the desired advantages, at the same time, it recreated the former objec-
tion concerning the mortgagor, namely, that he still lost his property
without regard to the fact that it might be worth considerably more
than the amount of his debt. To avoid this situation, equity initiated
the practice of requiring a foreclosure sale.' 0 At an early date the
English Chancellors began ordering such a sale when the mortgagor
requested it 11 and equitable grounds therefor were shown. In Amer-
ica, New York was among the first jurisdictions to substitute fore-
closure and sale for strict foreclosure, this practice being the customary
one almost since the Revolution.. 2  At that time strict foreclosure pre-
vailed in New England, where it still obtains in Massachusetts,'8 Con-
necticut, 14 and Vermont, 15 and in a minority of other jurisdictions.' 6
Obviously, however more desirable from the standpoint of public pol-
icy than the earlier practice, the procedure of foreclosure and sale
involved logical inconsistencies with the established doctrine that the
mortgagee under the mortgage took the fee title subject to defeasance.
If title became absolute on the breach of the mortgagor's covenant to
pay the debt, whence did the court derive its power to decree a sale?
Equity did not allow logic to interfere with the new procedure of
sale, however, and it gradually became the common method of fore-
8. Clark v. Rayburn, 8 Wall. 318 (U. S. 1868); Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461
(i86o); Frank v. Davis, 135 N. Y. 275, 31 N. E. ioo (1892) ; Parker v. Housefield,
2 Myl. & K. 419, 39 Eng. Rep. R. 1004 (1834) ; 2 BL. Comm. *157 et seq.; 6 KENT
Comm. x81 et seq.; TIFFANY, loc. cit. spra note 3.
9. The period allowed for redemption varied. Newall v. Wright, 3 Mass. 138
(18O7). (three years); Gilman v. Hidden, 5 N. H. 30 (1829) (one year) ; Parker v.
Housefield, 2 Myl. & K. 419, 39 Eng. Rep. R. 1004 (1834) (six months). It is now
two months in Massachusetts. 2 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. 244, § 5. Failure to pro-
vide for a period of redemption in a decree of strict foreclosure is reversible error, un-
less specific statutory authority to the contrary exists. Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 318
(U. S. 1868).
io. Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 318 (U. S. 1868); 6 KENT COMM. I81 et seq.; 3
TIFFANY, loc. cit. supra note 3.
ii. Chancellor Eldon in Mondey v. Mondey, i V. & B. 223, 35 Eng. Rep. R. 87
(1813).
12. Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 346 (N. Y. 1827); KENT COMM. 18I et seq.
13. 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. 244, § I. On default by the defendant in plead-
ing, or on determination of the issues in plaintiff's favor, the court enters judgment
that the defendant pay the mortgage debt with interest and costs within two months or
the plaintiff shall have the land, and on the expiration of that period without payment
the court awards execution for possession and costs to the plaintiff. Id. § 5.
14. 2 CoNx. GEx. STAT. (1930) tit. 52, C. 274, § 5090.
15. VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) tit. 12, c. 79, § 1548.
i6. See 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1518.
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closure, later with statutory regulation, throughout the United States.17
Furthermore, the problem has since become academic, in that the ma-
jority of American jurisdictions have abandoned the so-called title
theory, for the lien theory.'$
III. DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
The deficiency judgment, in its technical meaning, was unknown
to the early foreclosure practice. 19 Whereas originally strict fore-
closure meant that the mortgagee took the property in full satisfac-
tion of the debt,20 it subsequently became the rule that if the value
of the land was insufficient to compensate him in full he? might main-
tain an action at law on the bond for the balance.21 In fact, it came
-to be generally held that the mortgagee could pursue his equitable
remedy of foreclosure and his legal remedy of an action on the bond
concurrently.22 Such a procedure is obviously preferable, as a matter
of procedure, to the separate action at law on the bond for a deficiency,
as it obviates the necessity of two distinct actions. There is, however,
no authority in common law or equity to do so in the absence of statute
or special rule of court.23  It is a creature of statute now in force in
the majority of states.
2 4
i7. Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 3o6, 84 N. E. 75 (igo8) ; Hughes v. Harlam,
166 N. Y. 427, 6o N. E. 22 (igoi) ; Moulton v. Cornish, 138 N. Y. 133, 33 N. E. 842
(1893) ; 5 THOMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY (924) § 4775.
IS. 5 THoMPsoNq, REAL PROPERTY (1924) § 4367. Under this doctrine, the title re-
mains in the mortgagor, and the mortgagee is regarded as possessing only a lien on the
property to secure payment of his loan. It would seem that this theory more accurately
represents the actual relation of the parties.
19. The mortgagee could sell the equity of redemption upon execution under a
judgment in an action at law on the bond, but this practice was disapproved by Chan-
cellor Kent. See Tice v. Amnin, 2 Johns. Ch. 125, 130 (N. Y. 1816). It was subse-
quently prohibited by statute. 2 N. Y. REv. STAT. (1829) 368, §§ 31, 32. See Dela-
plaine v. Hitchcock, 6 Hill i4 (N. Y. 1843).
20. 6 KENT COMM. 182.
21. Amory v. Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562 (793) ; Globe Insurance Co. v. Lansing, 5
Cow. 380 (N. Y. 1826) ; Perry v., Barker, 13 Ves. 198, 33 Eng. Rep. R. 269 (x8o6).
In case of strict foreclosure, the deficiency was ascertained by estimate and proof of
the value of the realty. Amory v. Fairbanks, supra.
22. Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 18i); Burnell v. Martin, 2
Doug. 417, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 268 (1780) ; Booth v. Booth, 2 Atk. 343, 26 Eng. Rep. R.
6o9 (1742). There was a conflict between the English and American cases as to
whether an action at law on the bond after strict foreclosure opened it and allowed the
mortgagor to redeem. The American cases held that it did not. Amory v. Fairbanks,
3 Mass. 562 (i793); Globe Insurance Co. v. Lansing, 5 Cow. 380 (N. Y. 1826).
23. Orchard v. Hughes, i Wall. 73 (U. S. '863); Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black 599
(U. S. z862) ; Frank v. Davis, 135 N. Y. 275, 31 N. E. iioo (1892) ; Dunkley v. Van
Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 1818).
24. N. Y. CiV. PRAc. CODE (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § 1O83; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 25,
§:206; Shepherd v. Pepper, 133 U. S. 626 (i89o) ; Dodge v. Freedman's Savings and
Trust Co., io6 U. S. 445 (1882); People's Holding Co. v. Bray, i18 Conn. 568, 173
Atl. 233 (I934) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Guttag Corp., 265 N. Y. 292, 192 N. E. 481
(1934) ; 42 C. J. 29o, Federal courts are now authorized to grant deficiency judg-
ments under Equity Rule io. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Buckman, 82 F. (2d)
125 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
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For example, in New York, prior to 1829, the separate action
at law was the mortgagee's only remedy if he sought a deficiency.2 5 In
that year the Court of Chancery was authorized to grant a judgment
for a deficiency in the foreclosure suit.20  While a mortgagee may
still seek his deficiency judgment through a separate action instead
of doing it in the foreclosure, he has no absolute right to do so and
must obtain the permission of the court for good cause shown.27  Until
the enactment of the present "moratorium laws", there was no abridg-
ment in New York of the common law right of the mortgagee to
ignore his mortgage, if he preferred, and bring an action at law on
the bond for the entire amount.
However, in New Jersey, although the Court of Chancery was
formerly authorized by statute to enter a judgment for deficiency in
the foreclosure action 2 8 such authorization was repealed in 188o.29
There can be no action at law on the bond without foreclosing the
mortgage,30 and although the amount of the deficiency is determined
on foreclosure, a deficiency judgment can be obtained only in a sepa-
rate action at law brought within three months of foreclosure. 31
In Florida, the courts are authorized by statute to grant a defi-
ciency judgment in a foreclosure action, but it is optional with the
plaintiff to seek it there or bring a separate action at law.
32
When the foreclosure sale was substituted for strict foreclosure,
it was apparently regarded by the adopting courts, both at the time
and for long afterwards, as the final answer to the problem posed by
foreclosure of obtaining for the mortgagee the full amount to which
he was entitled, but no more, without hardship to the mortgagor.
Although it was assumed as an eternal verity that the sale would result
25. Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 1818).
26. N. Y. REV. STAT. (1829) pt. 3, C. I, tit. 2, art. 6, § 202, which became Section
167 of the Code of Procedure by N. Y. Laws 1863, c. 392, and later became Section
1627 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This statute, originally applicable only to the
mortgagor, was expanded to cover any party to the foreclosure who was liable to the
plaintiff for the debt. Section 1627 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by
N. Y. Laws 1876, cc. 448, 449, N. Y. Laws 1877, cc. 416, 422, and N. Y. Laws i88o,
c. 178. This section became Section 1083 of the New York Civil Practice Act.
27. Scofield v. Doscher, 72 N. Y. 491 (1878); Equitable Life Ins. Society v.
Stevens, 63 N. Y. 341 (1875); Cooper Co. v. Naumburg, 154 App. Div. 225, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 1005 (1912). See N. Y. Civ. PRAc. CODE (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § io78.
28. Currie v. Sisson, 34 N. J. Eq. 578 (i88i).
29. N. J. Laws I88o, c. 170, p. 255. From that time on, there could be no deficiency
judgment in the foreclosure suit. N. J. REv. STAT. (937) § 2:65-1. Hinkle v. Cham-
pion, 42 N. J. Eq. 61o, 8 Atl. 656 (1887) ; Toffey v. Atcheson, 42 N. J. Eq. 182, 6 Atl.
885 (I886).
30. N. J. Ray. STAT. (1937) § 2:65-2. See Pruden v. Savage, 7o N. J. L. 22, 23,
56 Atl. 69o (1904) ; cf. Franklin Loan and Bldg Ass'n v. Richman, 65 N. J. L. 526, 47
Atl. 426 (igoo).
31. Broadman v. Colonial Building-Loan Ass'n, 118 N. J. Eq. 275, 178 At. 775
(1935) ; Fruzynski v. Jablonski, 117 N. J. Eq. 117, 175 Atl. 112 (1934).
32. Reid v. Miami Studio Properties, Inc., 19o So. 5o5 (Fla. 1939); Coffrin v.
Sayles, 128 Fla. 622, 175 So. 236 (1937) ; Letchworth v. Koon, 99 Fla. 451, 127 So.
321 (1930).
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in an ideal equilibrium in the fundamental conflict between debtor and
creditor,3 3 the practice, however, proved to be not as happy as the
theory. It is common knowledge what happens to judicial sales in
times of depression. But even in normal times, the foreclosure sale,
especially in populous areas, was no criterion of value. Potential pur-
chasers preferred to deal with the mortgagee from whom they could
get the property at a lower price, since he had his deficiency judgment,
than they could if they had to bid against him at the foreclosure sale,
where it was to his interest to prevent them from getting the property
at less than the amount of the mortgage debt.
This system, of foreclosure sale with a deficiency judgment, oper-
ated for a long period of time to the detriment of the mortgagor. But
absent a statute, there were several devices available to the courts to
relieve against this undesirable condition.
i. Judicial discretion as to confirmation of sales: In this regard,
it is to be noted first, that in the pre-I933 era the prevailing view was
that once a sale was confirmed by the court the amount of the success-
ful bid thereat was conclusive in determining the amount of a defi-
ciency.3 4  The courts would not reduce a deficiency by reason of the
fact that subsequent to the rendition of the judgment the mortgagee
sold the property for a sum greater than the amount of the mortgage.35
Such relief as the courts afforded was granted in connection with
the sale.
But even with this discretionary power,3 6 it was seldom that the
court would exercise it. Thus, although inadequacy of price is an
element to be considered, the general rule is that it alone is insuffi-
cient.37  Moreover, the fact that an inadequacy so gross as to shock
33. The theory was that provided only that the sale be adequately advertised and
fairly conducted, independent bidders would appear and the property would be pur-
chased for its actual value. If such actual value were greater than the amount of the
mortgage, the surplus would be paid to the mortgagor, who was thus protected against
the sacrifice of his property; if less, the mortgagee was compensated for the inadequacy
of his security by a deficiency judgment.
34. Jacksonville Loan and Ins. Co. v. National Mercantile Realty and Improve-
ment Co., 77 Fla. 825, 82 So. 292 (1919).
35. Ramsden v. Keene Five Cents Savings Bank, 198 Fed. 807 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912);
Berman v. One Forty-Five Belmont Ave. Corp., io9 N. J. Eq. 256, 156 Atl. 83o (1931),
aff'd 112 N. J. Eq. 171, 163 Atl. 893 (1933). In Gordon v. Harris, 29o Mass. 482, 195
N. E. 744 (935) the court held that immediate resale at double the amount of the bid
was no evidence of bad faith. See de Funiak, Right to Deficiency Judgment Where
Mortgagee Purchasing at Foreclosure Sale Has later Resold at a Profit (1939) 27
Ky. L. J. 410.
36. Goodell v. Harrington, 76 N. Y. 547 (1879) ; Hale v. Clauson, 6o N. Y. 339
(1875) (where it was held that no appeal lay from the exercise of this discretion to the
Court Appeals). See also 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2105; 5 THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY (1924) § 4815.
37. Bovay v. Townsend, 78 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Orlove v. National
Savings & Trust Co., 98 F. (2d) 259 (App. D. C. 1938) ; Doyle v. Maxwell, 155 Ark.
477, 244 S. W. 732 (1922) ; Wright v. Branch, 27 Del. 484, go Atl. 41 (Super. Ct.
1914) ; Stallings v. Annapolis Savings Inst., 167 Md. 4, 172 Atl. 283 (1934) ; Hacketts-
town National Bank v. Smith, 125 N. J. Eq. 482, 6 A. (2d) 486 (1939) ; Fidelity Union
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the conscience of the court is likely to effect intervention by it is of
little moment since the degree of inadequacy required is very gross
indeed. 38  In fact, it has been flatly stated that inadequacy alone is
never sufficient grounds to deny confirmation.39  However, under an-
other attitude, where the property goes for an obviously low price,
the court is inclined to consider slight additional circumstances as
amounting to fraud or mistake, as a justification of their refusal to
confirm or their order to vacate the sale.40  Further, it has been held
that whereas other circumstances are necessary to justify vacating a
sale which; has already been confirmed, inadequacy alone, on the other
hand, will justify the refusal of the court to confirm a sale.4 1  And
it is likewise significant to note that the Pennsylvania court has re-
cently held that gross inadequacy is sufficient to set aside a sale.
42
2. Power to fix an upset price: Another long recognized, but
seldom invoked, power of a court of equity is to fix a so-called upset
price-a minimum sum which must be bid on a foreclosure sale, below
which no sale will be confirmed. 43  This device is used mostly for the
protection of bondholders in foreclosures of large corporate proper-
ties.44 It has, however, been applied also for the benefit of small
mortgagors, 45 although instances of it are too sparing to have made
Trust Co. v. Pasternack, 123 N. J. Eq. 181, 196 Atl. 469 (1938) ; Syracuse Trust Co.
v. Corey, 167 Misc. 5o6, 4 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 349 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; State Realty & Mort-
gage Co. v. Villaume, 121 App. Div. 793, io6 N. Y. Supp. 698 (Ist Dep't 1907). See
also 3 JONES, MORTGAGS (8th ed. 1928) § 2140.
38. This is apparent from a survey of the following cases where the court did in-
tervene: Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285 (1907) (property worth at least seven
times the amount of the bid) ; TMoeller v. Miller, 315 Ill. 454, 146 N. E. 449 (1925)
(value, $6,ooo-bid, $575); Detroit Trust Co. v. Hart, 274 Mich. 144, 264 N. W. 321
(1936) (value, $89,ooo-bid, $25,000) ; Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 264 Mich. 258, 249
N. W. 844 (933) (value, $185,ooo-bid, $5oooo); Ukrainian Nat. Ass'n v. Linden
Supply Co., 124 N. J. Eq. 400, 1 A. (2d) 941 (1938) (value, $I6,82o-bid, $3,000.
Here the New Jersey court departed from its rule that any sale would be confirmed
where there had been competitive bidding) ; Purdy v. Wilkins, 95 Misc. 7o6, i6o N. Y.
Supp. 17 (1916) (value, $24,5oo-bid, $1,300) ; Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Blickle,
330 Pa. 398, 199 Atl. 213 (1938) (value, $15,000 to $23,ooo-bid, $1,107.95).
39. Connely v. Rue, 148 Ill. 207, 35 N. E. 824 (1893); Carlisle v. Dunlap, 2o3
Mich. 6o2, 169 N. W. 936 (ii8).
4o. Ballentyne v. Smith, 2o5 U. S. 285 (19o7) ; Straus v. Anderson, 366 I1. 426,
9 N. E. (2d) 205 (1937); City National Bank & Trust Co. v. O'Keefe, 294 Ill. App.
56, 13 N. E. (2d) 293 (1938); Detroit Trust Co. v. Hart, 274 Mich. 144, 264 N. W.
3Z1 (1936); Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 264 Mich. 258, 249 N. W. 844 (933);
Ukrainian National Association v. Linden Supply Co., 124 N. J. Eq. 400, 1 A. (2d)
941 (1938) ; Crane v. Stiger, 58 N. Y. 625 (1874) ; Buffalo Savings Bank v. Newton,
23 N. Y. 16o (i86i). See Warm, A Study of Some of the Problems Contcenting Fore-
closure Sale and Deficiency Judgments (1936) 6 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 167, 176.
41. Straus v. Anderson, 366 Ill. 426, 9 N. E. (2d) 205 (937).
42. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Blickle, 330 Pa. 398, 199 AtI. 213 (1938).
43. See Warm, note 40 supra, at 191.
44. Manhattan Ry. v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 99 F. (2d) 789 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied 3o6 U. S. 641 (1939); Central Trust Co. v. Washington
County R. RM, 124 Fed. 813 (C. C. D. Me. 1903); Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Jora-
lemon Street Corp., 237 App. Div. 789, 263 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't 1933). ,
45. Bechtel v. Rocke, 288 Ill. App. 229, 5 N. E. (2d) 872 (1937) ; Farmers' and
Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Eagle Bldg. Co., 151 Misc. 249, 271 N. Y. Supp. 3o6 (Sup.
Ct. 1934).
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any substantial contribution to the problem of mitigating the hard-
ships of foreclosure sales.
3. Appraisal statutes: A form of relief analogous to that of the
upset price is the statute requiring appraisal of the mortgaged prop-
erty before sale on foreclosure to determine, approximately at least,
what price the land must bring in order to have the sale confirmed.
Ohio has had such a statute from the earliest days of its statehood,
and a sale will not be confirmed which brings less than two-thirds of
the appraised value.46  In Porto Rico, where the parties do not agree
on a value of the mortgaged property for sale purposes, the court is
authorized by statute to fix such value by appraisal in the foreclosure
action.47 The most interesting appraisal statute is that of Connecti-
cut,48 where strict foreclosure still prevails. 49 If the plaintiff seeks a
deficiency judgment, either he or the defendant may ask the court to
appoint three appraisers to fix the value of the property within ten
days after the expiration of the redemption period-the "law day".
The valuation so obtained is deducted from the amount due on the
mortgage, including taxes and prior encumbrances, and a deficiency
judgment is entered for the balance. When the appraisers' report
is submitted to the court, the defendant may file objections, but if
the report is accepted and approved it is conclusive. 50 This procedure
is used also where the mortgaged land has been sold in parcels to de-
termine how many parcels the plaintiff is entitled to in order to dis-
charge the debt which is owed him.51 It is to be noted, further, that
the appraisal and entry of deficiency judgments are all accomplished
in the foreclosure action.
52
46. Coe v. Columbus, Piqua and Indiana Road Co., io Ohio St. 372 (1859) ; Prov-
ident Bldg & Loan Ass'n v. Pekarek, 52 Ohio App. 492, 3 N. E. (2d) 983 (1936).
Likewise Louisiana requires that the sale bring at least two-thirds of the appraised
value. Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. Tallulah Cotton Oil Co., I5i La. 511, 9o
So. 779 (1922). See also I OKULA. STAT. (1931) § 451; Kahn v. Gray, 182 Okla. 177,
76 P. (2d) io42 (938); Viger v. Exchange Trust Co., i56 Okla. 146, i P. (2d) 194
(1932).
47. Porto Rico Rev. Statutes, Codes and Organic Laws (1913) IO63 et seq.;
Henna v. Sauri & Subira, 237 Fed. 145 (C. C. A. ist, igi6).
48. 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (i930) § 5083.
49. See note 14 supra.
5o. Wilcox v. Bliss, 116 Conn. 329, z64 Atl. 659 (1933). If the parties do not
move for an appraisal, the court may take testimony, fix the value and enter a deficiency
judgment thereon. Acampora v. Warner, 9i Conn. 586, ioI Atl. 332 (917); Suisman
v. Gorentz, 9o Conn. 618, 98 Atl. 89 (igi6) ; Windham County Savings Bank v. Himes,
55 Conn. 433, 12 Atl. 517 (1887).
5I. New England Mortgage Realty Co. v. Rossins, 121 Conn. 214, 183 Atl. 744
(1936) (where the court sustained this provision as to mortgages executed prior to
its passage, against the charge that it was unconstitutional as an impairment of the
obligations of contracts under Article I, Section io, of the Federal Constitution). See
p. 968 infra.
52. People's Holding Co. v. Bray, 118 Conn. 568, 173 At. 233 (i934).
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IV. LEGISLATION ARISING OUT OF THE DEPRESSION
It was manifest then, that the equity courts required some incen-
tive to move them to intervene. Furthermore, the inequities of the
established practice of foreclosure and sale, with a deficiency judg-
ment for the balance, were tremendously enhanced by the nation-wide
economic depression which began in 1929. 53 Such slight market as
previously existed at foreclosure sales rapidly disappeared. The sale
became a farce at which mortgagees obtained properties, often of
great intrinsic value, for mere nominal bids. As already noted, the
inherent equitable powers of the courts were so sparingly exercised
that they afforded scant relief. Appraisal statutes, as shown above,
existed only in a few isolated instances. In this situation, when in
1932-3 the bottom was dropping out of the real estate market, the
legislatures stepped in with statutes, some of limited duration and
some permanent, to give aid to distressed mortgagors.
The New York statute 54 is one of the so-called "mortgage mora-
torium laws". Its application was limited to mortgages executed prior
to July I, 1932, and although as originally enacted, it was to expire
July I, 1934, it is at present still in force, having been re-enacted
each year for ensuing periods of twelve months. 55  In fact, in 1938,
the legislature of that state adopted the policy of its emergency statute
as the permanent policy of the state, applicable to the foreclosure of
all mortgages. 56 By its terms, deficiency judgments are limited to the
amount by which the total mortgage debt, including principal, interest,
taxes, and any other expenses incurred by the mortgagee (such as
insurance, and costs of foreclosure) as fixed by the judgment of fore-
closure and sale, exceeds the fair market value of the property.
57
The mortgagee may, as before, bid in the property at a nominal sum
but his bid under the statute avails him nothing, because it no longer
forms the basis for a deficiency judgment. To obtain a deficiency
judgment, the plaintiff must make a motion therefor and the court
must thereupon determine, by affidavit or otherwise, the fair market
value of the mortgaged realty as of the date of sale, or, if there was
no market value at that time, as of the nearest date on which there
was a market value. 58 If the affidavits raise issues of fact, the court
53. See Stanley, The Effect of Economic Depression Upon Foreclomre (1939) 27
Ky. L. J. 365.
54. N. Y. CIV. PRAC. CODE (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § io83a, added by N. Y. Laws
1933, c. 794.
55. N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 607.
56. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. CODE (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § 1O83, as amended by N. Y. Laws
1938, c. 54o. See p. 971 infra.
57. Clarke v. Schumann, 269 N. Y. 6o, 198 N. E. 666 (935).
58. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. CODE (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § io83a, added by N. Y. Laws
1933, v. 794-
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will either try the issues by common law proof or appoint a referee
to do so.5 9
Statutes with like object but differing in detail have been enacted
in many other states during recent years,60 commencing with 1933
when the real estate market began to feel the full force of the nation-
wide economic depression. New Jersey adopted a statute providing
that in actions at law on the bond for a deficiency judgment, the court
must have the fair market value of the property ascertained and
deduct it from the mortgage debt in fixing the judgment.61 Arkansas
first enacted a law in effect abolishing deficiency judgments by requir-
ing the plaintiff in all foreclosures to stipulate that he would bid the
amount of the mortgage debt,6 2 but later adopted a less drastic statute
which required the court to refuse confirmation of a sale where the
price bid was less than the fair market value of the property, or where
it found that a better price could be obtained. 3 The Georgia statute
was similar, providing that no deficiency judgment could be entered
except where the sale had been confirmed on a finding that the prop-
erty sold for its true market value.6 4 In another type of legislation,
instead of altering the basis on which deficiency judgments could be
obtained, Minnesota merely extended the period allowed for redemp-
tion and suspended the bringing of actions for deficiencies until after
the expiration of such period. 5  The California enactment 06 pro-
hibited deficiency judgments unless notice of breach and election to
sell were recorded nine months prior to the sale. Pennsylvania,6 7 Ari-
zona,68 and Texas 69 likewise sought to limit the amount of a deficiency
59. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Eisner, 276 N. Y. 121, ii N. E. (2d)
561 (1937); New York Life Ins. Co. v. H. & J. Guttag Corp., 265 N. Y. 292, 192 N. E.
481 (934).
6o. See Note (1936) II TEmp. L. Q. 63.
61. N. J. Laws 1933, c. 82; N. J. Laws i935, c. 88; N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) V. i,
§ 2:65-5.x. The first statute was of unlimited duration and did not by its terms refer
to an emergency; the second refers to an emergency and was limited in operation to
July I, 1938. North Carolina's statute is simlar to the one in New Jersey, providing
that in any action to recover a deficiency after a sale under a mortgage or a deed of
trust, the fair value of the property must be offset against the debt. N. C. Laws, C.
275, H8 1, 2, 3 (permanent legislation).
62. Ark. Laws 1933, No. 57. This statute was of unlimited duration, but referred
to the existence of an emergency and applied only to mortgages executed prior to its
passage.
63. Ark. Laws 1933, No. 21, § 4, and id. 1935, No. 49, § 4 This was permanent,
not emergency legislation. See Miller v. Miller, 193 Ark. 362, oo S. W. (2d) 74
(1937), where, under the statute, confirmation of a sale was denied at which $i5,ooo
was bid for business property which rented for $4o per month.
64. Ga. Laws 1935, pt. I, tit. VII, No. 412, p. 381 (permanent legislation).
65. MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1938) §§ 9655-1 to 9666-4.
66. CA.. CODES AND GEN. LAws (Deering, Supp. 1935) § 376a.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 21, § 8o6 (an emergency statute of
limited duration).
68. ARiz. Ray. CODE (Courtright, Supp. 1936) §§ 2337a-g (permanent legislation).
69. Tax. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1938) v. 7, arts. 2218, 2218a (permanent legisla-
tion).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
judgment to the difference between the amount of the debt plus interest
and costs and the fair market value of the property; the first by peti-
tion in the foreclosure action, as in New York, and the latter two in
the separate action for deficiency, as in New Jersey. Indeed, the
Pennsylvania legislature has made three attempts along these lines to
help the debtor; 7o all three have been set aside as invalid.
71
I. Constitutionality: As might readily be expected, those statutes
were rapidly subjected to attack on constitutional grounds. The con-
stitutional provision relied on in all cases was that clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution which prohibits the enactment of state laws which
impair the obligations of contracts. 2  The contention advanced was
that while a state may constitutionally alter its remedies for the en-
forcement of contracts, it may not impair substantive rights by sub-
stituting a partial remedy for a complete one; and this was alleged
to be the effect of the statutes in question, since the mortgagee under
them would get a smaller deficiency judgment than he could have gotten
under the law existing when the mortgage was executed. This argu-
ment was, of course, submitted only in opposition to the application
of the statutes to pre-existing mortgages.
Although the United States Supreme Court has retreated from
its original strict position of Bronson v. Kinsie 73 and Gantley's Lessee
v. Ewing 74 and has allowed much wider scope to the police power
of the states 75 in interpreting the obligations of contracts clause, and
even though that court upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium Laws,7 6 nevertheless, the statutes limiting the
amount of deficiency judgments, whether permanent or definitely emer-
gency legislation of limited duration, have not been well received by
the state courts. For example, the statutes in both Texas and Cali-
fornia, although the latter was an emergency measure of limited dura-
tion, were held unconstitutional under the contracts clause on the
70. Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgments Acts of 1934, 1935 and 1937: PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 21, § 8o6 (I934 Act) ; id. §§ 808-820 (0935 Act) ; id.
88 821, 822 (937 Act). For a discussion of the 1937 Act, see Legis. (1938) 86 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 295.
71. See note 81 infra.
72. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § io. For an analytical discussion of the validity of some
of the older statutes, see Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933)
46 HAv. L. REv. io6i, lo67-1o74.
73. 1 How. 311 (U. S. 1843).
74. 3 How. 707 (U. S. 1845).
75. Compare the attitude of the Court in the New York emergency rent cases:
Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242. Also see as to like District of Columbia
legislation: Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921); Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921).
76. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), 34 COL. L.
REV. 361; Note (1934) 47 HARv. L. Ray. 66o. See note 65 supra.
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grounds that they diminished the remedy of existing mortgages. 77  It
is pertinent to note, however, that under the prior statute in Texas,
the entry of a deficiency judgment for the balance due over the sale
price was mandatory, not discretionary, as in New York. 8 Under a
similar statute 79 the same result was reached in Arizona. 0 Like-
wise in Pennsylvania 81 and Georgia 82 their respective statutes were
held unconstitutional as to existing mortgages on the grounds that
the common law of those states prior to the statutes in question gave
the mortgagee the right to have a deficiency judgment for the entire
debt less the sale price, that such right formed a part of the mortgage
contract and could not be constitutionally impaired. And the first
Arkansas statute, 83 which in effect abolished deficiency judgments
entirely, was properly held unconstitutional.8 4
Further, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey held
unconstitutional as to pre-existing mortgages its statute of 1933,85
providing that in an action at law on the bond for a deficiency the
fair value of the property was to be ascertained and deducted from
the mortgage debt, as an impairment of the remedy existing at the
time of execution of the mortgage.8 6  The decision was predicated
also on a provision of the State Constitution prohibiting the impair-
ment of contracts and the deprivation of remedies existing when a
contract was made.8 7  Under this more precise provision, it is diffi-
cult to see what other result could have been reached. Furthermore,
as pointed out by the court, there was not much need for such a
77. Billups v. Central Life Assurance Society, 88 S. W. (2d) 735 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935) ; Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 8o, 76 S. W. 1025 (1934). The California courts
felt that the statute diminished the amount of recovery allowed under the remedy pro-
vided by law which formed a part of the contract. Hales v. Snowden, ig Cal. App.
(2d) 366, 65 P. (2d) 847 (1937) ; Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal. (2d) 226, 54 P. (2d) 712
(1936). However in a later case involving a trust deed, the sole remedy for which
at the time of execution was a power of sale, the statute was held constitutionally ap-
plicable, as it was within the power of the legislature to create the new statutory rem-
edy of foreclosure and subsequently impair it by the later statute. Miller v. Hart, ii
Cal. (2d) 739, 81 P. (2d) 923 (1938).
78. Monaghan v. May, 242 App. Div. 64, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475 (2d Dep't 1934);
Home Owners Loan Corporation v. Wood, 164 Misc. 215, 298 N. Y. Supp. 427 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
79. Discussed p. 967 supra.
So. Bontag v. McCurdy, 48 Ariz. 168, 59 P. (2d) 326 (1936) ; Kresos v. White,
47 Ariz. 175, 54 P. (2d) 8oo (1936).
81. Beaver County Building & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 187 Atl. 481
(1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 114. The 1934 statute was held invalid in Shallcross v.
North Branch-Sedgwick Building & Loan Ass'n, 123 Pa. Super. 593, 187 Atl. 819
(1936), (937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 321. The 1937 statute was ruled out in Pennsyl-
vania Co. v. Scott, 329 Pa. 534, 198 Atl. 115 (938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 91.
82. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S. E. 15 (935).
83. See p. 967 supra.
84. Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 6I S. W. (2d) 686 (933).
85. See p. 967 supra.
86. Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., iii N. J. L. 596, 169 Atl. 177 (933). Ac-
cord: American Homes Building & Loan Ass'n v. Angelillis, ii N. J. Misc. 952, 169
Atl. 817 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
87. N. J. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 7, I[ 3.
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statute because of the ample protection provided for the mortgagor
under the doctrine of Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Low-
enstein,88 against unconscionably low bids. The, subsequent statute
of 1935, which differed only in that it was a temporary emergency
law, was likewise ruled invalid for the same reason.89 That this is
an attitude firmly entrenched in New Jersey is illustrated by the case
of Alert Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Bechtold,90 where in spite of a de-
cision of the Supreme Court of the United States upholding the North
Carolina statute 91 against attack under the contract clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the New Jersey court nevertheless invalidated its
own enactment, ruling the State Constitution not affected by the fed-
eral decision.
The latter case, Richmond Mortgage and Loan Corp. v. Wacho-
via Bank and Trust Co.,92 was by far the most profound approach
to the constitutional problem which had been made up to that time.
In answering the contention that substantive contract right was im-
paired because the new statutory remedy did not allow as large a recov-
ery as was usually obtained through the remedy existing when the
contract was made, the Supreme Court looked beyond that point to
examine the contract relation itself and what the parties were entitled
to thereunder. It found that the lender was entitled to recover the
money he loaned, with interest, either in cash or property of equivalent
value, and he could not complain if the state substituted a remedy
which gave him just that.93  The fact that under a prior procedure,
he might have gotten more than what was due him was unavailing;
the substitution of a more equitable remedy did not impair the obli-
gation of a contract within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.
Mr. Justice Roberts, writing the opinion of the Court, stated:
"The loan rendered the appellees debtors to the appellant.
For that debt the borrower pledged real estate as security. The
contract contemplated that the lender should make itself whole, if
necessary, out of the security, but not that it should be enriched
88. H13 N. J. Eq. 2oo, 166 AtI. 538 (Ch. 1933). See p. 974 infra.
89. Alert Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bechtold, 12o N. J. L. 397, 199 Atl. 734
(1938) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Bryant, 14 N. J. Misc. 243, 183 Atl. 825 (Sup.
Ct. 1936) ; Sayre v. Duffy, 13 N. J. Misc. 458, 179 Atl. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
9o. 12o N. J. L. 397, 199 Atl. 734 (1938).
91. Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U. S.
124 (I937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 533, 35 MICH. L. REv. lOO3.
92. Ibid.
93. The North Carolina statute involved required the fair value of the property to
be offset against the total debt in an action for a deficiency after a foreclosure sale or
a trustee's sale under a power contained in a deed of trust. The sections relative to
mortgages has been previously upheld in Woltz v. Asheville Safe Deposit Co., 2o6 N.
C. 239, 173 S. E. 587 (I934). The Wachovia case concerned the section relative to
deeds of trust.
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at the expense of the borrower or realize more than would repay
the loan with interest." 94
The New York emergency statutes 9, limiting deficiency judg-
ments were also sustained as constitutional, against the claim of im-
pairment of the obligations of contracts, but solely on the theory that
they were emergency legislation.96 The court's rationale was that
by reason of the emergency the statutes were valid as an exercise of
the police power of the state under the doctrine of the United States
Supreme Court in the "Rent Cases" 97 and in Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell.98  The statute of I938,99 by which the Legislature
adopted the emergency procedure of obtaining deficiency judgments
as the permanent public policy of the state applicable to the foreclosure
of all mortgages, has not yet been passed on by the court of appeals.
There are, however,, two state supreme court decisions, which, unfor-
tunately, are conflicting. Whereas one case declared that the perti-
nent section of the Act was unconstitutional as to mortgages executed
subsequent to July 1, 1932, but prior to the effective date of the amend-
ing statute,100 a later and quite recent holding sustained the statute
upon the ground that the remedy was under the control of the Legis-
lature.101
2. Effect of the Statutes on the Courts: Despite this failure of
the emergency statutes to withstand tests of constitutionality, they did
perform the very beneficial function of awakening the equity courts
to a realization of their inherent powers, 02 which though long dor-
mant, have always been in their possession, and which, had they been
properly exercised before, would have obviated the necessity of legis-
lative intervention. 03
The leading case in New York illustrating this new trend is Mon-
aghmn v. May.'0 4 The lower court erroneously held the emergency
law 'or applicable to a foreclosure instituted before its passage. The
94. Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 3oo U. S.
124, 129 (1937).
95. N. Y. Civ. PR~c. CoDE (Cahill, Supp. 1936) §§ Io83a, 1o83b.
96. Honeyman v. Hanan, 275 N. Y. 382, 9 N. E. (2d) 970 (937), appeal dis-
missed, 302 U. S. 375; Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 19o N. E. 324 (934).
97. See note 75 supra.
98. 290 U. S. 398 (934).
99. N. Y. Laws 1938, c. 51o, amending § io83 of the Civil Practice Act. See p. 966
supra.
SOO. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Margolis, 168 Misc. 945, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 432
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
IOI. Otselic Valley 1Nat Bank v. Dapson, 170 Misc. 514, 1o N. Y. S. (2d) 588
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
102. See note 36 supra.
103. See p. 964 sUpra.
IO4. 242 App. Div. 64, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475 (2d Dep't 1934).
105. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. CODE (Cahill, supp. 1936) § io83a.
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Appellate Division, while holding the statute inapplicable, did not re-
verse the judgment below, which had denied a deficiency judgment
after a finding under the statutory procedure that the fair market
value of the property exceeded the debt. It held rather that a court
of equity had inherent power to grant or deny confirmation of the
sale, and this included the lesser power to confirm on condition that
the fair market value, rather than the price bid, be adopted as the
basis for a deficiency judgment. Mr. Justice Carswell, writing the
opinion of the court, said:
"When the Legislature spoke, mortgagors and mortgagees
learned, earlier than they would have if left to the results of in-
voking judicial power, that continued abnormal economic condi-
tions would not be permitted to unjustly oppress the borrower.
But the judicial power to effect the same results has always been
and still is there, responsive to a proper case for its exercise-apart
from the statutory declarations. 106
"The court having the power to refuse to confirm the report
of sale because the price was inadequate, it likewise had the kin-
dred power to refuse to authorize the entry of a deficiency judg-
ment based on such a sale and computed on such an inadequate
or nominal price base." 107
The court further pointed out that the old section of the Civil Prac-
tice Act relating to deficiency judgments was not mandatory,10 8 as
had apparently been assumed from the long continued practice of auto-
matically granting a judgment for the difference between the amount
bid and the amount of the debt, but was rather discretionary.
The doctrine of this case has been approved and applied in many
other New York cases. 10 9 For instance, in Dry Dock Savings Insti-
tution v. Harriman Realty Corp.," 0 the court held that in an action
to foreclose a mortgage not covered by the emergency laws, it had
the power to order the fair value to be ascertained, in order to deter-
mine the amount of a deficiency judgment."' It is interesting to note
lo6. Monaghan v. May, 242 App. Div. 64, 65, 66, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475, 478 (2d
Dep't 1934).
107. Id. at 67, 273 N. Y. Supp. at 480.
io8. Former Civil Practice Act § lO83: ". . . the final judgment may award
payment by him of the residue of the debt . . ." (italics supplied).
lO9. See notes 11o-112 infra.
Iio. 15o Misc. 86o, 270 N. Y. Supp. 428 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 244 App. Div. 793,
280 N. Y. Supp. 981 (Ist Dep't 1935). In Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Schumann
Associates, 15o Misc. 221, 268 N. Y. Supp. 674 (Sup. Ct. 1934), the plaintiff in Feb-
ruary, 1933, foreclosed a $9ooo mortgage on property which had sold in 1931 for $17,6oo.
At the foreclosure sale he bid in the property at $50o, and obtained a deficiency for the
balance. Later he sold the property for $12,ooo. Although Section Io83a was inap-
plicable because the action was instituted prior to its enactment, the court on defend-
ant's motion vacated the deficiency judgment, holding that its inherent equitable power
to vacate the sale included the lesser power to deny or vacate a deficiency judgment.
iii. Dry Dock Savings Institution v. Harriman Realty Corp., 15o Misc. 86o, 86r,
270 N. Y. Supp. 428, 43o (Sup. Ct. 1934). See also Vogel v. Edwards, 249 App. Div.
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further, that in another case, the court adopted as a formal rule of
court, the application of the method prescribed in Section Io83a of
the Civil Practice Act for the determination of the amount of defi-
ciency judgments in the foreclosure of all mortgages, whether ex-
ecuted before or after July I, 1932.
"We hold that there is vested in equity the right to prevent
injustice, and that the exercise of its power does not require the
fiat of the Legislature. We hold that equity is not impotent, but
that its power should be exercised, and such powers are not here
limited. We hold that this court has the power to determine
the manner and the time when the determination as to a liability
for deficiency shall be made, and that it necessarily follows that
it has the right to determine the methods and procedure by which
the liability for deficiency shall be fixed . . . We hold the grant-
ing of a deficiency judgment is not mandatory under section
1083 of the Civil Practice Act." 112
Unfortunately, this doctrine was rejected and the decision in
Monaghan v. May 113 expressly disapproved by the Court of Appeals
in Emigrant Ildustrial Savings Bank v. Van Bokkelen." 4  That
court held that prior to the enactment of Section Io83a of the Civil
Practice Act, and subsequently as to all mortgages not affected by it,
a judgment of foreclosure and sale, unless the sale was set aside, fixed
the right to a deficiency judgment in the amount by which the mort-
gage debt plus interest and costs exceeded the amount bid at the sale,
pursuant to Section 1083 of the Civil Practice Act." 5  That this is
"bad law" in addition to being an unfortunate result, is indicated by
subsequent decisions."6
However, the rule of the inherent power of equity has found
approval in other jurisdictions. 117 In Suring State Bank v. Giese,18
a mortgage for $2000 was foreclosed. The property was bid in by
the plaintiff for $6oo. The court below found the fair value of the
property to be over $2000 and denied a deficiency judgment. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in affirming the decision, held that the
742, 291 N. Y. Supp. 683 (2d Dep't 1936); Guaranteed Title and Mortgage Co. v.
Scheffres, 247 App. Div. 294, 285 N. Y. Supp. 464 (2d Dep't 1936) ; Kurtz v. Ferrante,
243 App. Div. 739, 277 N. Y. Supp. 542 (2d Dep't 1935).
112. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Wood, 164 Misc. 215, 219, 298 N. Y. Supp. 427,
432 (Sup. Ct. 1937), (1938) 51 HAv. L. REv. 749.
113. See p. 971 supra.
114. 269 N. Y. iio, i9g N. E. 23 (1935).
11S. Accord, Guaranteed Title & Mortgage Co. v. Scheffres, 275 N. Y. 30, 9 N. E.
(2d) 764 (I937), reversing, 247 App. Div. 294, 285 N. Y. Supp. 464 (2d Dep't 1936);
Chase v. Harvey, 253 App. Div. 15, i N. Y. S. (2d) 541 (3d Dep't I937).
iI6. See p. 977 infra.
117. See Note (935) 84 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 223.
118. 2io Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (I933) ; accord, First National Bank v. Bush,
287 Ill. App. 632, 5 N. E. (2d) 605 (1936).
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inherent equity powers of the court enabled it either to deny confirma-
tion of the sale and order a resale, with or without fixing an upset
price, or to confirm the sale on condition that the plaintiff credit against
it the fair value of the property. The court also held that the mort-
gagee should be allowed to choose whether to accept the property at
the fair value or have a resale with an upset price.
An excellent case, which probably best illustrates the beneficent
exercise of the innate powers of a court of equity, is Federal Title &
Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein,119 decided by the New Jersey
Court of Chancery in 1933. On foreclosure of a mortgage on prop-
erty worth $27,500, the plaintiff bid it in for $ioo. In presenting
objections to the confirmation of the sale, counsel for the defendant
showed by affidavit that on the same day about thirty other properties
in the same locality, ranging in value from $5,ooo to $41,OOO, had
been sold on judicial sales and were all bid in for $ioo, illustrating
that irrespective of the intrinsic worth, or "fair market" value of the
properties, there was no actual market by reason of the lack of pur-
chasers. Vice-Chancellor Berry refused confirmation unless the plain-
tiff would stipulate to accept $27,500 as the value of the property
for the purpose of fixing the amount of deficiency judgment which
he might seek to obtain subsequently in an action at law. The Vice-
Chancellor reviewed the history of the subject and found that a court
of equity had ample power to prevent such injustice through its power
to refuse confirmation of the sale.120 The Court pointed out that
under the circumstances of that case, although the device of a sale
was used, the situation was in reality more analogous to a strict fore-
closure.' 21
The rule of this decision has been somewhat limited by subse-
quent cases which have held that in order to have the benefit of its
application any defendant must establish that the following factors
are each present in his case: (i) that the successful bid was uncon-
119. 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 Atl. 538 (Ch. 1933).
12o. Accord: Better Plan Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Holden, 114 N. J. Eq. 537, 169
Atl. 289 (Ch. 1933).
121. Vice-Chancellor Berry said: "A sale which the court may, by virtue of its
inherent power, direct, it may also, by virtue of the same power, refuse to approve and
confirm. The present sale being in effect a strict foreclosure, the ancient practice of
appraising the property for the purpose of fixing the deficiency, originally adopted for
the protection of the mortgagee, should now be invoked for the protection of the mort-
gagor. 'Equality is equity.' It would be unjust to permit the mortgagee to extort
double satisfaction from the mortgagor, and it would be equally unjust to compel the
mortgagee to accept inadequate security in satisfaction of his debt. But it is consid-
ered no injustice to the mortgagee, when a judicial sale of mortgaged premises accom-
plished no more than a strict foreclosure, to revert to the English practice referred to
and require the mortgagee to accept that security at its fair value and give him the right
to proceed on the bond for the deficiency. In this manner both parties are protected
and exact justice is accomplished." Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowen-
stein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 208, 166 AtI. 538, 542 (Ch. 1933).
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scionably low or, that there was no competitive bidding; (2) that an
emergency existed whereby he was unable to obtain refinancing; (3)
that his own financial status was such that he could not protect him-
self at the sale.
122
The last requirement, by reason of the fact that it considers the
financial status of the mortgagor in each case, appears more desirable
than the necessarily more general provisions of any statutory limita-
tion of deficiency judgments, since it prevents an affluent mortgagor
from merely unloading such property he does not want on a possibly
indigent mortgagee. But it is refreshing to note that the principles of
the Lowenstein case, as limited, have been approved and applied by
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals.1
23
It is interesting to note also that the Pennsylvania courts after
invalidating the state deficiency judgment statutes, 2 4 have brought
about the same result intended by the legislation, in holding that the
foreclosure sale must not prove wholly inadequate. 123
V. THE DECISION IN HONEYMAN V. JACOBS 126
It was in this state of the law that the constitutionality of sec-
tion Io83a of the Civil Practice Act, imposing the emergency restric-
tions on deficiency judgments in New York, was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. In Honeyman v. Jacobs, decided
in April, 1939, a decision which may well be regarded as a landmark
in the law of mortgages, the plaintiff foreclosed a mortgage of $15,000
and bid in the property for $7,5oo. The mortgage had been made in
1928 and was therefore subject to the emergency section of the Civil
Practice Act. On the statutory proceedings for deficiency, the trial
court found the property to be worth $25,ooo and denied a deficiency
judgment. Plaintiff appealed on constitutional grounds, contending
that the requirement of deducting the fair value instead of the bid
price from the mortgage debt was an impairment of the obligations
of contracts in violation of the Federal Constitution. After affirm-
ance by the Court of Appeals,' 27 a further appeal was taken to the
United States Supreme Court. That Court, in an opinion by Chief
justice Hughes, held Section Io83a constitutional. The most impor-
tant aspect of the decision is that the statute was not upheld on grounds
of the emergency; that feature was not even mentioned by the Court.
Its validity was based rather on the broadest possible grounds-the
122. Young v. Weber, 117 N. J. Eq. 242, 175 Atl. 273 (Ch. I934); Maher v. Usbe
Bldg & Loan Ass'n, ii6 N. J. Eq. 475, 174 Atl. 159 (Ch. 1934).
123. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Dreyfuss, 121 N. J. Eq. 281, 189 Ati. 631 (1937);
National Mortgage Corp. v. Deering, 121 N. J. Eq. 274, 189 Atl. 64 (1937).
124. See note 81 supra.
125. See note 42 supra.
126. 3o6 U. S. 539 (939).
127. 278 N. Y. 467, 17 N. E. (2d) 131 (938).
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inherent powers of equity. The Court held that courts of equity have
inherent power to control foreclosure proceedings in the interest of
fairness-to fix terms of sale, to refuse to confirm a sale which was
unfairly conducted or at which an inadequate price was obtained-
which powers included the lesser one of controlling the amount of
deficiency judgments. The statute is merely declaratory of those
powers. 128  The court, cognizant of the true relationship between the
parties, pointed out that the mortgagee was entitled to recover his
money, with interest, and no more, and if the practice which pre-
vailed before the statute enabled him to obtain more than was his due,
such excessive recovery was not a vested right beyond the power of
the legislature to infringe.
"The question is whether in the instant case the denial of a
deficiency judgment substantially impaired appellant's contract
right. The bond provided for the payment to him of $I5,OOO
with the stipulated interest. The mortgage was executed to se-
cure payment of that indebtedness. The contract contemplated
that the mortgagee should make himself whole, if necessary, out
of the security but not that he should be enriched at the expense
of the debtor or realize more than what would repay the debt
with the costs and expenses of the suit. Having a total debt of
$15,771.17, with expenses, etc., of $1,319.03, appellant has ob-
tained through his foreclosure suit the property of the debtor
found without question to be worth over $25,ooo. He has that
in hand. We know of no principle which entitles him to receive
anything more. Assuming that the statute before its amend-
men permitted a recovery of an additional amount through a so-
called deficiency judgment, we cannot say that there was any
constitutional sanction for such a provision which precluded the
legislature from changing it so as to confine the creditor to secur-
ing the satisfaction of his entire debt." 129
Although this decision involved emergency legislation, the prin-
ciples enunciated by the Supreme Court equally sustain a permanent
statute of like terms. This follows from the fact that the court ex-
pressly followed the Wachovia Bank case 130 where permanent legisla-
tion was in issue. In closing his opinion, following a discussion of the
Wachozia Bank case, the Chief Justice said:
128. "Section Io83a in substance assured'to the court the exercise of its appropriate
equitable powers. By the normal exercise of these powers, a court of equity in a fore-
closure suit would have full authority to fix the terms and time of the foreclosure sale
and to refuse to confirm sales upon equitable grounds where they were found to be un-
fair or the price bid was inadequate. . . . In this control over the foreclosure sale
under its decree, the court could consider and determine the value of the property sold
to the mortgagee and what the mortgagee would thus realize upon the mortgage debt
if the sale were confirmed." Honeyman v. Jacobs, 3o6 U. S. 539, 543 (i939).
129. Id. at 542-543.
130. 300 U. S. 124 (1937).
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
"We reach a similar result here upon the same ground-
that under the finding of the state court the mortgagee has ob-
tained satisfaction of his debt and that the denial by the statute
of a further recovery does not violate the constitutional provi-
sion."' 31
The Court also cited with approval the decisions of the Appellate
Division of New York in Monaghan v. May, 132 and Guaranty Title
& Mortgage Co. v. Scheffres,' 3M of which the former had been dis-
approved 134 and the latter reversed 135 by the court of appeals.
It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Honeyman v. Jacobs conclusively establishes the con-
stitutionality of Section IO83 of the Civil Practice Act as amended
in 1938.130 Although that statute has not yet been passed on by the
court of appeals, the New York Supreme Court upheld its constitu-
tionality on the authority of the Honeyman case. 137  Furthermore, in
1939, while the majority of the court was holding the new Section
IO83 applicable to a mortgage executed prior to its enactment but not
covered by Section Io83a, a concurring opinion sustained its consti-
tutionality on the basis of Honeynwn v. Jacobs.1
3 8
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR A SIMPLIFIED FORM OF FORECLOSURE
The foregoing lengthy analysis of the historical development of
mortgage foreclosures, the evolution of the modern practice of sales
and deficiency judgments, the injustices which have arisen in the oper-
ation of the same, the efforts made to remedy them and the problems
arising thereunder has been made for the purpose of ascertaining
what elements of that practice are essential in producing a more equi-
table balance of the conflicting interests involved, and must therefore
be preserved, and what elements, regardless of their origin, have be-
come mere form, to be discarded in the interests of an improved
procedure. It is submitted that the study which has been made jus-
tifies the following conclusions:
I. The foreclosure sale evolved as a device to protect the mort-
gagor from the loss of property worth more than the debt which he
131. Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 539, 545 (1939).
132. 242 App. Div. 64, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475 (2d Dep't 1934). See p. 971 supra.
133. 247 App. Div. 294, 285 N. Y. Supp. 464 (2d Dep't 1936).
134. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank v. Van Bokkelen, 269 N. Y. i1O, i99 N. E.
23 (1935).
135. Guaranteed Title & Mtge. Co. v. Scheffres, 275 N. Y. 30, 9 N. E. (2d) 764
(1937).
136. N. Y. Laws 1938, c. 510.
137. Tompkins County Trust Co. v. Herrick, 171 Misc. 929, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 825
(Sup. Ct 1939).
138. National City Bank v. Gelfert, 257 App. Div. 465, 468, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 6oo,
603 (2d Dep't 1939).
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is unable to pay, but, so far from achieving that purpose, it has on
the contrary operated to take his property from him and in addition,
impose upon him a money judgment for substantially the amount of
the debt for which he has already lost his property.
2. The foreclosure sale is generally a useless formality which does
not benefit the mortgagor; it causes the mortgagee unnecessary ex-
penses, which, in turn, harm the mortgagor by increasing the costs
of the action for which he is liable; and, in the interest of both par-
ties it might better be dispensed with except under particular cir-
cumstances to be discussed below.
3. A deficiency judgment, based on the difference between the
sales price and the total mortgage debt plus costs, does not operate
fairly in that it frequently awards an unjust enrichment to the mort-
gagee.
4. The conception that the mortgagee has a vested right to a
deficiency judgment for which the base is the bid at a foreclosure sale
is false and has been dispelled by the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Honeyman v. Jacobs.
5. A deficiency judgment based on the difference between the
fair market value of the property, ascertained by appraisal or other
competent means under the direction of the court, and the mortgage
debt plus interest and costs, is constitutional as the permanent public
policy of any state, in accord with the fundamental principles of equity,
and beneficial to both mortgagor and mortgagee, as it protects the
former against what may amount to double liability and affords the
latter the full amount to which he is equitably entitled.
These conclusions would seem to point to a partial return to the
ancient practice of strict foreclosure, which still obtains in certain
New England states.' 39 With certain modifications, it is believed
that under such a procedure, the courts will be better equipped to serve
the interests of both parties, and at much lower cost.
Three distinct situations should be borne in mind and separately
provided for.
(a) Where the mortgagee does not ask for a deficiency judgment:
The procedure of strict foreclosure should be followed here. After
the time to plead has expired as to all defendants, and they have de-
faulted in pleading, the plaintiff should be permitted to enter final
judgment, as in other actions where the defendants default. This
judgment should give him execution for possession of the property,
and forever bar and foreclose the defendants from any title, right,
139. See p. 96o supra.
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interest or lien thereon. In this situation, the foreclosure sale is a
meaningless farce and an entirely unnecessary expense. This pro-
cedure could be followed also where the defendant, instead of default-
ing, defends on the merits, and the trial results in a determination in
favor of plaintiff. If, of course, the defendant sustains his defense,
then the usual judgment in favor of defendant against plaintiff for
costs would be appropriate. In regard to costs in plaintiff's favor,
it would appear equitable to award them, in addition to judgment for
possession of the property, only against a defendant who had defended
unsuccessfully, and not against one in default.
(b) Where the mortgagee seeks a deficiency judgment: In this
situation, the statute should require either appraisal or the fixing of the
value by the court in the manner at present provided in New York
by Sections 1o83 and 1o83a of the Civil Practice Act. On defendant's
default in pleading or failure to sustain an alleged defense, plaintiff
should be required to make a motion on notice, as presently required
in New York, for the determination of the fair market value of the
property. Even if in default in pleading, the defendant sought to be
charged should be permitted, as he is in New York today, to offer
evidence as to value and to litigate the question. If a deficiency is
found to exist in accordance with this procedure, the judgment should
award the plaintiff execution for possession of the property and for
the recovery in money of the balance so ascertained to be owing. If
the plaintiff fails to establish a right to a deficiency judgment, the
cost of this proceeding should be borne by him.
(c) Where a defendant believes the property to be worth more
thanz the amount of the mortgage debt: In this situation, where a fore-
closure sale is manifestly to the defendant's benefit, he should be per-
mitted to demand one. This could be done on notice to the plaintiff
by filing a formal demand with the court at any time before entry of
judgment. If the price obtained at the sale is insufficient to pay the
total mortgage debt and the expenses of sale, the latter should be
borne by the demanding party. This right to require a sale should be
available to any defendant against whom a deficiency judgment may
be sought, and to the owner of the equity of redemption, regardless
of whether a deficiency judgment is sought against the latter or not.
A possible logical difficulty in a return to strict foreclosure might
be said to exist in the lien theory states, since under the present pro-
cedure the mortgagee who has foreclosed acquires his title through
deed from the referee appointed by the court to conduct the sale. This
difficulty, however, is inconsequential, in that it is a matter of pure
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theory. It has already been shown that no practical difference results
from the adoption of either theory, and, in fact, that many states
where the foreclosure sale prevails have yet adhered to the title
theory.140  Conversely, a lien theory state could as a practical matter
just as readily adopt strict foreclosure. Some states, for the sake of
logical consistency, might prefer to return to the title theory upon
adopting strict foreclosure. Others might prefer to preserve the lien
theory but provide by statute that a'judgment of foreclosure shall
operate to transfer title to the plaintiff in whose favor it is rendered.
The form of procedure outlined has in addition the advantage
of simplicity and low cost without sacrifice of the rights of either
party. The defendant would not be denied any possible benefit which
a sale might afford him, as he might demand and obtain one if he
wanted it. And, on the other hand, if the plaintiff sought a deficiency
judgment, the defendant would be protected against double liability
in the same manner in which the present New York procedure pro-
tects him.
A large number of foreclosures are those in which the defendants
default and the plaintiff does not seek a deficiency judgment. In these
cases, the law should afford the plaintiff a cheap and expeditious rem-
edy. This he would have under the procedure outlined here.
At the very outset, reference was made to the high costs of fore-
closure in New York and many other states under existing procedure.
These excessive expenses all arise in connection with the sale which,
it is submitted, is a useless farce anyway. They are composed of
referee's fees, auctioneer's fees, the charge for the use of an auction
room, and, specially, the cost of advertising. This last item is par-
ticularly absurd, as the advertisements are generally read by no one
not competent to ascertain the information from the court records.
These expenses, excluding attorney's fees, run anywhere from $350
to $5oo in New York, and may be still higher where special compli-
cations arise.
The proposed procedure of strict foreclosure, except in the spe-
cial situation referred to above, eliminates the sale entirely and with
it, the concomitant expenditures-referees' and auctioneers' fees, rent
of auction rooms, and advertisement. The cost of a simple foreclosure
would then consist merely of attorneys' fees, the title search, a few
dollars for filing the lis peeius, complaint and judgment, and, of
course, the process-server's charges.
140. See p. 96o supra.
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this simplification of procedure and reduc-
tion of costs would be of inestimable benefit, not only to mortgagees,
but to mortgagors and home owners as well, and to the real estate
market generally, for the following reasons:
I. The person of modest means who wishes to own his home
will be able to obtain the loan he needs more easily and on better
terms since the lender now knows that, if necessary, he can foreclose
without exorbitant expense.
2. Where taxes are in arrears, the mortgagee is apt to be more
patient if he is not faced with a costly proceeding, in addition to the
back taxes which he must pay, in order to take title.
3. By reducing the cost of enforcing the security, mortgages on
real estate will become a more attractive investment, and the value of
real estate will rise.
4. The impetus to home building resulting from the greater avail-
ability of loans for the purpose will raise the real estate market out
of its present sorry state and will also cause a revival in the building
industry.
